


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COMIREX-M-23

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COMMITTEE ON IMAGERY REQUIREMENTS AND EXPLOITATION

COMIREX-M-23
18 January 1968

*Approved conditional
per M-23*

The following is an index of the Minutes of the 18 January 1968
COMIREX meeting:

Page 4 Special Briefing - Problems Encountered in Establishment
and Use of Grid Reference System

Section I (Approval of Minutes, Briefings and Reports on Operations)

Page 5 Approval of Minutes

Page 5 Operational Briefing--Satellite

5 Report on Aircraft Activity--Far East

7 Report on Drone Activity--Far East

8 Report on Aircraft Activity--Cuba

**NRO REVIEW
COMPLETED**

Section II (NPIC Briefing)

Page 10 Mission Highlights

Page 11 Imagery Exploitation Group - Status Report

Section III (Subcommittee and Working Group Reports)

Page 13 Report from Imagery Collection Requirements Subcommittee

Section IV (Action Items)

None

Section V (Status of Recent COMIREX Papers)

Page 14 Requirements for Imagery Surveillance by Satellite Recon-
naissance of Targets in the Soviet Bloc and Communist China
(Reference OPCEN 6807)

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Special Briefing

See COMIREX-M-30-2/1

Problems Encountered in Establishment and Use of Grid Reference System

1. The DIA member introduced [] Deputy Chief, Special Activities Photo Laboratory in DIAAP-10. [] informed COMIREX that DIAAP-10 had established Universal Grid No. 1 (UG #1) in 1964 on an informal basis. In 1967 UG #1 was established on a formal basis. [] advised COMIREX that in four years of operation the errors in use of the grid had been minimal. Recently, however, the need to accommodate the alternate grid systems used for [] and KH-4B photography format have presented problems. In answer to a question from the DIA member, [] explained that the instructions on the markings on the photography and the use of the grid come from NPIC.

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2. [] presented graphics showing the difficulties encountered in making new photographic formats compatible with reproduction equipment and with the present Briefing Print Enlarger (BPE). To accommodate the BPE, conversion factors must normally be used or the operator must revert to visual plotting. [] noted that there are shortcuts, such as collocation of the PI, the lab technician and other personnel in the case of the KH-4B, but that such shortcuts are by and large quite unsatisfactory and invite errors. []'s third illustration of a major problem was associated with production of the Consolidated Mission Completion Index (CMI). The CMI is produced by DIA. [] identified a number of problems associated with processing incompatible information into the ADPS and the AIF.

25X1A

3. The Chairman thanked [] for the presentation. [] then requested [] to arrange for representatives of NPIC and DIAAP-10 to get together in the interest of further study of the problems and for NPIC to brief COMIREX on this same subject on either 25 January or 1 February.

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
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Section I (Approval of Minutes, Briefings and Reports on Operations)


Approval of Minutes



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1. COMIREX-M-21 minutes were approved as written.

Operational Briefing--Satellite



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25X1A

2.  reported satellite scheduling as follows:

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


CORONA

1045 - 24 January 1968

NRO
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1046 - 13 March 1968



25X1D




Report on Aircraft Activity--Far East




25X1A
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25X1A

3.  reported BLACK SHIELD and IDEALIST/TACKLE activity as follows:

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25X1

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
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
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COMIREX-M-23

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a. BLACK SHIELD Missions [redacted] were flown over North Vietnam on 4 and 5 January. Virtually cloud-free coverage was obtained on all the highest interest areas. Approximately 75 per cent of North Vietnam was covered on these two missions. The coverage included the cities of Hanoi and Haiphong, most of the usable SAM sites, five of the major airfields, principal power plants, key road and rail networks, and major logistics centers such as Dong Dang and Ping Hsiang.

25X1D

b. An IDEALIST/TACKLE mission, C018C, was flown on 5 January. It covered an area along the China coast from Ningpo to the Swatow area. No significant activity was noted.

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25X1D

4. [redacted] submitted the following report of [redacted] activity:

25X1D

<u>Date</u>	<u>Mission No.</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
5 Jan	Not scheduled	
6 Jan	5T2/5T46	CNX HQ
	5T3/5T2	CNX HQ
7-12 Jan	Not scheduled	
13 Jan	5T004	CNX OPS
14-18 Jan	Not scheduled	


5. [redacted] reported photographic coverage achieved against two South China/North Vietnam requirements as follows:

25X1A

a. Coverage of lines of communications (LOC) pertinent to the introduction of Chinese forces into North Vietnam (see COMOR-D-25/207, 4 Mar 1966). The number of LOC priority targets in South China and North Vietnam remains at 178. As reported to the Chairman, COMIREX, for the period 4-10 January 1968, surveillance coverage was reported on five priority targets in North Vietnam. During


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
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
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
COMIREX-M-23





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<u>Date</u>	<u>Mission No.</u>	<u>Areas/Targets</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
7 Jan	Q639	NVN/So China/Laos	Did not return
11 Jan	Q643	So China	Successful, MARS
12 Jan	Q409	NVN	Successful, water recovery
	Q424	Haiphong Port	Successful, MARS
13 Jan	Q416	Haiphong Port	Successful, MARS
15 Jan	Q422	--	Recalled MX, lost
17 Jan	Q422	NVN	Successful, MARS

Report on Aircraft Activity--Cuba



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
7.  reported  coverage of Cuba
as follows:

25X1D

<u>Date</u>	<u>Mission No.</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
5 Jan	G005	Successful, 8.3% coverage
6 Jan	Not scheduled	
7 Jan	Not scheduled	
8 Jan	Not scheduled	
9 Jan	G006	CNX WX
10 Jan	G006	CNX WX
11 Jan	Not scheduled	

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Mission No.</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
12 Jan	Not scheduled	
13 Jan	Not scheduled	
14 Jan	G006	CNX WX
15 Jan	Not scheduled	
16 Jan	G006	Successful, 6.6% coverage
17 Jan	Not scheduled	
18 Jan	G007	Results unknown at this time

Recap

<u>Mission</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Net</u>	<u>Cumulative</u>
G005	5 Jan 68	8.3%	21.0%
G006	16 Jan 68	6.6%	27.6%

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25X1D

8. [] reported that for the 56-day period beginning 23 November, ten [] missions were flown over Cuba and provided 79 per cent coverage of the area. During this period 181 of the 187 targets in Cuba were covered completely on cloud-free photography.

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Section II (NPIC Briefing)

Mission Highlights

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1. [] first board was photography from [] taken on 5 January 1968. The photography showed a sizeable truck convoy at Chen-Nan-Kuan, China, six miles south of Ping Hsiang. [] noted that the convoy appeared to be in the process of crossing over into North Vietnam, consisted of over 140 trucks, and 30 of these appeared to have probable field artillery pieces attached to them. In replying to a question, [] explained the difference between AAA and field artillery carriages. [] then remarked that the photography had some of the earmarks of a unit in motion. The Chairman queried [] as to the inference that the photography might show a unit in motion. In reply, it was said that no firm evidence of a military unit per se was identified but that the information he could report was the identification of probable FA in tow and the size of the convoy crossing the border. [] pointed out that entry into North Vietnam of a Communist Chinese field artillery unit would represent an entirely new level of Chinese involvement. The Chairman requested the DIA and CIA members to study all the implications of the information presented. [] also urged that photography of points of entry and truck routes be given priority consideration. The Chairman concluded with the request that the subject be discussed again on 25 January.

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2. [] showed a photograph of Alma Ata taken by [] Mr. Lowery noted that activity observed at an Alma Ata SA-2 site on [] now suggested some sort of special activity. At the site a bunker building has appeared and a rail device leads from it to the launcher. One launcher was unoccupied; two were occupied. The special activity could represent the need to handle a fueling problem or might be associated with precautions required in connection with a special warhead. [] second board on Alma Ata

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showed a considerable increase in canister activity at a SAM support facility, possibly associated with an SA-2 site in question, and a new building. In reply to a question from the Chairman, [redacted] advised that the electronics and the launchers observed definitely established the missile concerned as an SA-2, no possibility of an SA-5.

25X1A

Imagery Exploitation Group - Status Report

[redacted]

25X1

3. In accepting the following status report for the week of 12-17 January from [redacted] the Chairman requested that members study it and submit suggestions on format and content at a subsequent meeting; if necessary, a briefing could be arranged.

25X1A

Mission Exploitation:

a.	KEYHOLE Missions	Date Rec'd	OAK Date/Complete	OAK Supplement Date/Complete
	[redacted]	[redacted]		
	1102	OAK cable disseminated 16 January 1968		
	1102	OAK Supplement cable released 17 January 1968		

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b.	Others	On Hand Beginning of Period	Received During Period	Completed	On Hand End of Period
	[redacted]	0	G006	0	G006
	CHURCH DOOR	C018C	0	C018C	0
	[redacted]	9	3	5	7
	[redacted]	Q423, Q424, Q642, Q637, Q641, Q643	Q416, Q425	Q637, Q641, Q642, Q425 Q643, Q423, Q424, Q416	

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25X1D

25X1A

[redacted]		165	300	72
		0	0	0
		1	0	8
		0	0	
		232	172	312
* [redacted] were reported as complete on IEG Status Report for week of 3-11 January 1968. A re-scan of the missions is in progress.			11	

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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OMIREX-M-23

Project Status Summary as of 11 January 1968

		Basic Support:	122
a.	Projects on hand at the beginning of period:	Direct Support:	81
		In Hold:	168
b.	Projects received during period.....:	32	
c.	Projects completed during period.....:	28	
		Basic Support:	127
d.	Projects on hand at the end of the period....:	Direct Support:	106
		In Hold:	142

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Section III (Subcommittee and Working Group Reports)

Report from Imagery Collection Requirements Subcommittee

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25X1A

1. reported ICRS activities as follows:

25X1D

b. Coverage Obtained by KH-4 Missions.

The KH-4 program produced clear, stereo panoramic photography of over 70 per cent (4.8 million sq. nm) of the built-up areas during 16 June-22 December 1967 and approximately 76 per cent (2.1 million sq. nm) of the underdeveloped areas during the last twelve months of the USSR, East European Satellites, Communist China and North Korea. The statistical breakdown of coverage acquired by individual missions, during this time period is available in the monthly status report (COMIREX-D-72/48 dtd 5 January 1968).

c. Review of Far East Long Range Requirements. The status of coverage against the high resolution requirements in the Far East is attached as Tab C.

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
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Section V (Status of Recent COMIREX Papers)

Requirements for Imagery Surveillance by Satellite Reconnaissance
of Targets in the Soviet Bloc and Communist China (Reference
OPCEN 6807)

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1. The Chairman introduced discussion of the paper he proposes to send to USIB as a forwarding memorandum for surveillance targets with comments on certain specific paragraphs:

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Re 1.d. - In the final paper it may not be necessary to have this paragraph.

Re 1.f. - The two sentences starting with "in other words" and ending with "to need [redacted] missions" were included inadvertently and should be deleted.

25X1D

Re 2. - Although the acquisition of baseline photography has not been a real problem and will probably not become one, some level of effort should be allocated so that the level of performance against this requirement can be measured.


Re 2.b. - The coverage of most current intelligence targets will probably be achieved under a normal surveillance program. The need for coverage of some additional targets must be recognized, however, and like baseline it provides mission planners with a little additional flexibility.

Re 4.a. - The Chairman noted that Mr. Reber felt that this paragraph was a little ambiguous. The DIA member said he had some proposed changes.

2. The Chairman next showed three charts to illustrate the confidence calculation which will be described in more detail as an introduction to Annex A. The first chart was based on one

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25X1D

mission while the second and third generally illustrated the improvement that might be expected when a second and third mission were included. The first chart was based on Mission [redacted] while the second went backward to include [redacted] and the third added [redacted]

25X1D

25X1A

3. [redacted] invited attention to the fact that [redacted] was somewhat of a freak in that it covered 39 of the targets in the category selected. The Chairman pointed out that despite this the chart did not approach 100 per cent confidence. The techniques used in the confidence calculations do not permit misweighting due to unusual occurrence of this sort. The CIA member remarked that the category chosen by the Chairman for illustrative purposes happened to be one where the homogeneity factor was least predominant. [redacted] also expressed his opinion that the category is one which is least in need of coverage [redacted] At this point the CIA member emphasized the need to put into perspective the relationship between KH-4 [redacted] The CIA member admonished those preparing the final requirements to give due recognition to the ability of a medium resolution system to provide entirely satisfactory surveillance of some targets. [redacted] felt that proper recognition must be given to the interrelationship of KH-4 [redacted] on a number of scores, some of which he would propose be included in the paper.

25X1D

4. The DIA member had a number of changes which are to be incorporated in a new draft of the paper. They are:

25X1D

Para 1.c. - Rewrite as follows: The KH-4 and [redacted] can best meet the needs of the intelligence community if mission-by-mission guidance is developed in accordance with guidance established by USIB and modified, as necessary, in the light of current intelligence needs.

25X1D

Para 1.f. - Delete second sentence and substitute the following: Even so, it will still be necessary to cover some targets [redacted] resolution on a basis frequently enough to satisfy current intelligence needs.

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Para 4.a. - Insert after the following:
"when operationally feasible".

25X1D

Para 4.d. - Delete last sentence.

Para 5 - Insert new second sentence as follows:
As yet there is not an agreement among the COMIREX members as to which approach will provide the optimum basis for a realistic, cost-effective and meaningful expression of requirements by the Board. Additional research by the intelligence community and data from NRO as requested in the recommendations are required before selection of one approach over the other will be possible.

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